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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of capital taxation in a dynamic heterogeneous-agent economy
with uninsurable entrepreneurial risk. Although it allows for rich general-equilibrium effects and
a stationary distribution of wealth, the model is highly tractable. This permits a clear analysis,
not only of the steady state, but also of the entire transitional dynamics following any change
in tax policies. Unlike either the complete-markets paradigm or Bewley-type models where
idiosyncratic risk impacts only labor income, here it is shown that capital taxation may actually
stimulate capital accumulation. This possibility emerges because of the general-equilibrium
effects of the insurance aspect of capital taxation. In particular, for the preferred calibrated
version of the model, when the tax on capital is 25%, output per work-hour is 2.2% higher
than it would have been had the tax rate been zero. Turning to the welfare effects of a reform
in capital taxation, it is examined how these effects depend on whether one focuses on the
steady state or also takes into account transitional dynamics, as well as how they vary in the
cross-section of the population (rich versus poor, entrepreneurs versus non-entrepreneurs).
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the macroeconomic and welfare effects of capital-income taxation in an en-
vironment where agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic investment risk. Such risk is empirically
important for entrepreneurs and wealthy agents, who, even though they represent a small fraction
of the population, yet they hold most of an economy’s wealth. In this context, capital taxation
raises an interesting tradeoff between the distortion of investment versus the provision of insurance
against idiosyncratic capital-income risk. On the one hand, capital taxation comes at a cost, since
it distorts agents’ saving decisions. On the other hand, it has benefits, since it provides agents with
partial insurance against idiosyncratic investment risk. This suggests that a positive tax on capital
income could be welfare-improving, even if it reduced capital accumulation.
Most surprisingly though, it is shown that a positive tax on capital income may actually stimu-
late capital accumulation. Indeed, the steady-state levels of the capital stock, output and employ-
ment may all be maximized at a positive value of the capital-income tax. This possibility emerges
because of the general-equilibrium effects of the insurance aspect of capital taxation. This result
stands in stark contrast to the effect of capital taxation both under complete-markets models,
and under incomplete-markets models with uninsurable labor-income risk alone. In these mod-
els, capital-income taxation, irrespectively of whether it is welfare-improving or not, necessarily
discourages capital accumulation.
Model. This paper represents a first attempt to study the effects of capital-income taxation
in a general-equilibrium incomplete-markets economy, where agents are exposed to uninsurable
idiosyncratic investment risk. The framework builds on Angeletos (2007), who develops a variant of
the neoclassical growth model that allows for idiosyncratic investment risk, and studies the effects
of such risk on macroeconomic aggregates. Agents own privately held businesses that operate
under constant returns to scale. Agents are not exposed to labor-income risk, and they can freely
borrow and lend in a riskless bond, but they cannot diversify the idiosyncratic risk in their private
business investments. Abstracting from labor-income risk, borrowing constraints, and other market
frictions, isolates the impact of the idiosyncratic investment risk and preserves the tractability of the
general-equilibrium dynamics. The present model extends Angeletos’s model in the following ways.
First, a government is introduced, imposing proportional taxes on capital and labor income, along
with a non-contingent lump-sum tax or transfer. Second, agents have finite lives, which ensures
the existence of a stationary wealth distribution. Third, there is stochastic, though exogenous,
transition in and out of entrepreneurship, which helps capture the observed heterogeneity between
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs without the complexity of endogenizing occupational choice.
Fourth, labor supply is endogenous. Clearly the first element is essential for the novel contribution
of the paper. The other three improve the quantitative performance of the model and demonstrate
the robustness of the main result.
Preview of results. The main result of the paper is that an increase in capital-income taxation
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may actually stimulate capital accumulation. The intuition behind this result comes from recog-
nizing that the overall effect of the capital-income tax on capital accumulation can be decomposed
in two parts. The first part captures the response of capital to the tax in a setting with endogenous
saving but exogenously fixed interest rate. This is isomorphic to examining the effects of the capital
tax in a “small open economy”. In this context, it is shown that an increase in the capital-income
tax unambiguously decreases the steady-state capital stock. The second part, which is the core
result of this paper, captures the importance of the general-equilibrium adjustment of the interest
rate for wealth and capital accumulation. Here, an increase in the tax reduces the effective variance
of the risk agents are exposed to. This reduces the demand for precautionary saving, and therefore
increases the interest rate, which in turn increases steady-state wealth. With decreasing absolute
risk aversion, wealthier agents are willing to undertake more risk, and hence they will increase their
investment in capital. In other words, the general-equilibrium effect of the interest rate adjustment
is a force that tends to increase investment and the steady-state capital stock.
For plausible parameterizations of the closed economy, the general equilibrium effect dominates
for low levels of the capital-income tax, so that steady-state capital at first increases with the tax.
In particular, for the preferred calibrated version of the model, the steady-state capital stock is
maximized when the tax on capital is 40%. So, for example, when the tax on capital is 25%, output
per work-hour is 2.2% higher than what it would have been had the tax rate been zero. The result
that the steady-state capital stock is inversely U-shaped with respect to the capital-income tax
is robust for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. Furthermore, the tax that
maximizes steady-state capital is increasing in risk aversion and/or the volatility of idiosyncratic
risk. This finding reinforces the insurance interpretation of the tax system.
Subsequently, the paper examines the aggregate and welfare effects of eliminating the capital-
income tax. This is because an extensive discussion has been conducted within the context of the
complete-markets neoclassical growth model about the welfare benefits of setting the capital-income
tax to zero. In light of the main result here, revisiting this discussion is worthwhile. In particular,
the aggregate and welfare effects are presented from two different perspectives. On the one hand,
one might be interested in examining the welfare of the current generation immediately after the
policy reform, taking into account the entire transitional dynamics of the economy towards the
new steady state with the zero tax. On the other hand, one might be interested in examining the
welfare of the generations that will be alive in the distant future, i.e. at the new steady state with
the zero tax.
First, consider the macroeconomic effects of eliminating the capital-income tax. When markets
are complete, investment increases in the short run, and it is also higher at the new long-run steady
state with the zero tax, compared to the old steady state with the positive tax. By contrast, in the
present model of incomplete markets, investment falls in the short run, as well as in the long run.
Second, consider the welfare effects of eliminating the capital-income tax. These vary across the
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different types of agents, the different levels of wealth, and the current versus the future generations.
In the current generation, poor agents, whether entrepreneurs or non-entrepreneurs, prefer the zero
tax. This is because most of their wealth comes from wage income, and, with capital fixed, the
present value of wages increases due to a fall in the interest rate. Rich agents, on the other hand,
prefer a positive tax, since they benefit more from insurance provision.
In the long run, all types of agents, and at all levels of wealth, prefer a positive tax on capital
income. However, the cost of switching to a zero-tax regime is much higher for poorer than for
wealthier agents of all types. This is because, in the long run, the elimination of the tax decreases
the steady-state capital stock, thereby decreasing the present value of wages. Therefore poorer
agents will suffer the most, since human wealth constitutes a big part of their total wealth.
Literature review. This paper focuses on entrepreneurial risk, because such risk is in fact
empirically relevant, even in a financially developed country like the United States. For example,
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) find that 75% of all private equity is owned by agents for
whom such investment constitutes at least half of their total net worth. Furthermore, 85% of private
equity is held by owners who are actively involved in the management of their own firm.1 Given
this evidence about the US, one expects that entrepreneurial risk must be even more prevalent in
less developed economies, where a large part of production takes place in small unincorporated
businesses and where risk-sharing arrangements are much more limited.
Furthermore, idiosyncratic investment risk need not be interpreted as affecting solely the owners
of privately held businesses. In recent work, Panousi and Papanikolaou (2008) find a significant and
robust negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and the investment of publicly traded firms
in the US. In addition, they show that this relationship is stronger in firms where the insider mangers
hold a larger fraction of the firm’s shares, and they provide evidence for a possible explanation that
has to do with managerial risk aversion. Combined with the work of Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002), this demonstrates that a large fraction of total investment in the US, whether
by publicly traded or privately held businesses, is sensitive to idiosyncratic risk, and therefore
strengthens the empirical applicability of the present model setup.
This paper relates to the strand of the macroeconomic literature discussing optimal taxation
and the effects of taxation. However, most of this literature has focused on labor income risk.
Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) first established the result of zero optimal capital taxation in the
long run when markets are complete. Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) generalized this result to
most of the short run for an interesting class of preferences, and to the case of finitely lived agents.
Aiyagari (1995) extended the complete-markets framework to include uninsurable labor income
risk and borrowing constraints. In this context, when only a limited set of policy instruments are
available, it becomes optimal to tax capital in the long run: a positive capital tax increases welfare,
1Further evidence for these observations is also provided by Quadrini (00), Carroll (02), Gentry and Hubbard
(00), and Cagetti and DeNardi (06).
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but it unambiguously lowers the level of the capital stock.2
A related but different normative exercise is conducted by Davila et al. (2007). They examine
constrained efficiency, in the spirit of Geanakoplos-Polemarchakis, within a version of Aiyagari’s
model. This exercise does not allow for risk-sharing through taxes or any other instruments, and
instead considers an efficiency concept where the planner directly dictates to the agents how much
to invest and to trade. Angeletos and Werning (2006) examine a similar constrained efficiency
problem in a two-period version of a model with idiosyncratic investment risk. Albanesi (2006)
considers optimal taxation in a two-period model of entrepreneurial activity, in a constrained ef-
ficiency setting, and following the Mirrlees optimal policy tradition. The benefit of her approach
is that the source of incomplete risk-sharing is endogenously specified as the result of a private
information (moral hazard) problem, and that there are no ad hoc restrictions placed on the tax
instruments. However, her model does not allow for dynamics, for long-run considerations, or for
general-equilibrium effects like those studied in the present paper. In general, the extensive theo-
retical work on taxation originating from the Mirrlees and the new dynamic public finance tradition
focuses on labor-income risk, as does the literature that examines the optimal progressivity of the
tax code.3
The growing literature on the effects of borrowing constraints on entrepreneurial choices has
examined policy questions, and especially the implications of replacing a progressive with a propor-
tional income-tax schedule, in an Aiyagari-type environment, i.e. with decreasing returns to scale
at the individual level, borrowing constraints, and undiversifiable labor income risk. Some examples
in this area include Li (2002), Domeij and Heathcote (2003), Meh (2005), Cagetti and DeNardi
(2007), and Kitao (2007). Benabou (2002) develops a tractable dynamic general-equilibrium model
of human capital accumulation with endogenous effort and missing credit and insurance markets.
Within this framework he examines the long-run tradeoffs of progressive taxation and education
finance. Finally, Erosa and Koreshkova (2007) examine the long-run effects of switching from
progressive to proportional income taxation in a quantitative dynastic model of human capital.
This paper also relates to the branch of the public finance literature that considers the effects of
capital taxation on portfolio allocation and risk-taking. Domar and Musgrave (1944) first proposed
the idea that proportional income taxation may increase risk-taking, by having the government
2Alvarez et al. (1992), Erosa and Gervais (2002), and Garriga (2003), show that in life-cycle models the optimal
capital-income tax is in general different from zero, at least if the tax code cannot explicitly be conditioned on the
age of the household. Conesa et al. (2008) quantitatively characterize the optimal capital- and labor- income tax
in an overlapping-generations model with idiosyncratic uninsurable labor-income shocks and permanent productivity
differences across households, and find for an optimal capital-income tax of 36%. Uhlig and Yanagawa (1995) show
that, under mild conditions, higher capital-income taxes lead to faster growth in an overlapping-generations economy
with endogenous growth. It should be noted, however, that the results of the present paper do not depend on a
life-cycle or overlapping-generations setup. Instead, they arise in the context of the standard neoclassical framework
of infinitely-lived agents.
3Some examples here include Golosov et al. (2003), Albanesi and Sleet (2005), Conesa and Krueger (2006),
Werning (2007), and Reiter (2004).
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bear part of the risk facing the agents.4 This idea was formalized by Stiglitz (1969), within a two-
period single-agent model, where asset returns and the level of saving are exogenously given, but
where the agent optimally chooses the allocation of his fixed amount of saving between a risky and
a riskless asset. Ahsan (1974) extended Stiglitz by endogenizing the intertemporal consumption-
saving decision in a two-period model. He showed that the partial-equilibrium effect of capital-
income taxation on risk-taking is in general ambiguous. By contrast, in the “small open economy”
version of the present model, which differs from Ahsan’s in that the horizon is infinite and the
return to capital is endogenous, it is shown that the steady-state capital stock is decreasing in
the capital-income tax. This finding highlights that the results here are driven by, novel to the
literature, general-equilibrium effects.
As already mentioned, the present model builds on Angeletos (2007), who abstracted from policy
questions and considered instead the effect of investment risk on macroeconomic aggregates. The
contribution of the present paper is to study the effects of capital-income taxation on aggregates
and welfare. Angeletos and Panousi (2009), in a framework like the one in Angeletos (2007),
examine the effects of government spending on macroeconomic aggregates, but for the case where
government spending is financed exclusively through lump-sum taxation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
individual behavior and the aggregate equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 characterizes the steady
state in terms of aggregates and distributions. Section 5 presents and discusses the main theoretical
result. Section 6 presents the calibration methodology and the parameter choices, along with
the implications of the preferred calibrated model for aggregates and distributions. Section 7
quantifies the steady-state effects of capital taxation, as well as the short-run and long-run effects
of eliminating the capital-income tax. Section 8 examines the robustness of the results to the
availability of a safe asset in positive net supply. Section 9 concludes. All proofs are delegated to
the appendix.
2 The Model
Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0,∞). There is a continuum of agents distributed uniformly
over [0, 1]. At each point in time an agent can be either an entrepreneur, denoted by E, or a laborer,
denoted by L. The probabilities of switching between these two types are exogenous. In particular,
the probability that an agent will switch from being an entrepreneur to being a laborer is pEL dt,
and the probability that he will switch from being a laborer to being an entrepreneur is pLE dt.
The measure of entrepreneurs in the economy at time t is denoted by χt.
In what follows, and for expositional simplicity, labor is taken to be exogenous. All of the
proofs, which are delegated to the appendix, and all of the calibrations, will consider the general
4Sandmo (1977) extended this idea to the case of multiple risky assets.
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case of endogenous labor, where preferences are homothetic between consumption and leisure, i.e.
they are of the King-Plosser-Rebelo (1988) specification.
2.1 Preferences
All agents are endowed with one unit of time. Preferences are Epstein-Zin over consumption, c,
and they are defined as the limit, for ∆t→ 0, of 5:
Ut = { (1− e−β∆t) c1−1/θt + e−β∆t (Et [ U1−γt+∆t ] )
1−1/θ
1−γ } 11−1/θ , (1)
where β > 0 is the discount rate, γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and θ > 0 is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. For θ = 1/γ, this reduces to the case of standard expected
utility, Ut = Et
∫∞
t e
−β s U(cs) ds, where U(ct) =
c
1−1/θ
t
1−1/θ .
2.2 Entrepreneurs
When an agent is an entrepreneur, he owns and runs a firm operating a constant-returns-to-scale
neoclassical production function F (k, l), where k is capital input and l is labor input. An en-
trepreneur can only invest in his own firm’s capital, although he supplies and employs labor in
the competitive labor market. Capital investment in his firm is subject to uninsurable risk. The
idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d., hence there is no aggregate uncertainty. An entrepreneur can also
save in a riskless bond.
The financial wealth of an entrepreneur i, denoted by xit, is the sum of his holdings in private
capital, kit, and the riskless bond, b
i
t:
xit = k
i
t + b
i
t . (2)
The evolution of xit is given by:
dxit = (1− τKt ) dpiit + [ (1− τKt )Rt bit + (1− τLt )ωt + Tt − cit ] dt , (3)
where dpiit are firm profits (capital income), Rt is the interest rate on the riskless bond, τ
K
t is the
proportional capital-income tax, ωt is the wage rate in the aggregate economy, τLt is the proportional
labor-income tax, Tt are non-contingent lump-sum transfers received from the government, and cit
is consumption. Finally, a no-Ponzi game condition is imposed.
Firm profits are given by:
dpiit = [ F (k
i
t, l
i
t)− ωt lit − δ kit ] dt + σ kit dzit , (4)
where F (k, l) = kαl1−α with α ∈ (0, 1), and δ is the mean depreciation rate in the aggregate
5Lemma 1 in the appendix gives the formal description of preferences.
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economy. Idiosyncratic risk is introduced through dzit, a standard Wiener process that is i.i.d.
across agents and across time6. The scalar σ measures the amount of undiversified idiosyncratic
risk, and is an index of market incompleteness, with higher σ corresponding to a lower degree of
risk-sharing, and σ = 0 corresponding to complete markets.
2.3 Laborers
When an agent is a laborer, he cannot invest in capital, and he can only hold the riskless bond. He
also supplies labor in the competitive labor market. Financial wealth for a laborer i is therefore:
xit = b
i
t , (5)
and its evolution is given by:
dxit = [ (1− τKt )Rt bit + (1− τLt )ωt + Tt − cit ] dt . (6)
2.4 Government
At each point in time the government taxes capital and bond income at the rate τKt , and labor
income at the rate τLt . Part of the tax proceeds is used by the government for own consumption
at the deterministic rate Gt. Government spending does not affect the utility from private con-
sumption or the production technology. The remaining tax proceeds are then distributed back
to the households in the form of non-contingent lump-sum transfers, Tt. The government budget
constraint is therefore:
0 = [ τLt FLt(
∫
i
kit, 1) + τ
K
t (FKt(
∫
i
kit, 1)− δ )
∫
i
kit −Gt − Tt ] dt , (7)
where FKt(
∫
i k
i
t, 1) is the marginal product of capital in the aggregate economy, FLt(
∫
i k
i
t, 1) is the
marginal product of labor, and
∫
i l
i
t = 1.
2.5 Finite lives and annuities
All households face a constant probability of death, with Poisson arrival rate v dt at every instant
in time.7 There is no intergenerational altruism linking a household to its descendants, and utility
6Idiosyncratic risk is modeled here as coming from uninsurable i.i.d. depreciation shocks. However these shocks
could also be modeled as or interpreted as i.i.d. productivity shocks.
7The (small) positive probability of death is introduced in order to guarantee the existence of a stationary wealth
distribution. In general, with finite lives and no altruism, Ricardian equivalence might fail, since some of the tax
burden associated with the current issue of a bond is borne by agents who are not alive when the bond is issued. Here,
for v = 0, Ricardian equivalence holds, because all agents can freely borrow in the riskless bond. The theoretical
steady-state results for the aggregates are derived for v = 0, and they carry through for v small but positive. However,
it might still be the case that the dynamic effects of time-varying policy changes possibly depend on the validity of
Ricardian equivalence. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this paper, the government budget constraint will be written
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is zero after death. The discount rate in preferences can then be reinterpreted as β = β˜ + v, where
β˜ is the psychological or subjective discount rate and v is the probability of death8.
In order to isolate the effects of capital-income risk, it is assumed that there exist annuity
firms permitting all agents to get insurance against mortality risk, by freely borrowing the entire
net present value of their future labor income. As a result, all agents have (safe) human wealth,
denoted by ht, and defined as the present discounted value of their net-of-taxes labor endowment
plus government transfers:9
ht =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ s
t ( (1−τKj )Rj+v ) dj( (1− τLs )ωs + Ts ) ds . (8)
Then, the total effective wealth, wit, for an agent is defined as the sum of his financial and
human wealth, i.e. wit ≡ xit + ht. Hence, effective wealth for an entrepreneur is given by:
wit = k
i
t + b
i
t + ht , (9)
and effective wealth for a laborer is given by:10
wit = b
i
t + ht . (10)
3 Equilibrium
This section characterizes individual behavior and the general equilibrium in the economy. The
analysis will be in closed-form, since, as will be shown, the wealth distribution is not a relevant
state variable for the characterization of aggregate equilibrium dynamics.
as in (7) for v positive but small.
8Since utility is zero after death, this is a valid interpretation that does not violate the axioms of expected utility.
9Let h˙t = (Rt + v)ht − ωt, and bt = −ht. Then, b˙t = Rtbt − vht + ωt. These equations are consistent with each
other and with market clearing, and they have two alternative but isomorphic interpretations. First, in the beginning
of time, every agent borrows from annuity firms an amount equal to his entire human wealth. From then on, he
repays this debt every period by giving up his wage plus interest to the annuity firms, and this only stops when he
dies. Second, the annuity firms borrow from the agent his entire human wealth, and every period from then on they
repay the agent by giving him wage plus interest, until the agent dies. Either of these interpretations is consistent
with the analysis here.
10It is assumed that capital is fully fungible upon exit from entrepreneurship. The assumption of exogenous
transition probabilities is maintained here for tractability, in order to ensure a closed-form solution. This assumption
could have the interpretation that, at some random point in time, the agent is given the chance to operate a high-
return, high-risk technology, while at some other random point in time the option to save in this alternative technology
is taken away (for example, the agent has an idea which depreciates at some exogenous rate).
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3.1 Individual Behavior
Entrepreneurs choose employment after their capital stock has been installed and their idiosyncratic
shock has been observed. Hence, since their production function, F , exhibits constant returns to
scale, optimal firm employment and optimal profits are linear in own capital:
lit = l(ωt) k
i
t and dpi
i
t = r(ωt) k
i
t dt+ σ k
i
t dz
i
t , (11)
where l(ωt) ≡ arg maxl[F (1, l)− ωt l ] and r(ωt) ≡ maxl [F (1, l)− ωt l ]− δ. Here, rt ≡ r(ωt) is an
entrepreneur’s expectation of the return to his capital prior to the realization of his idiosyncratic
shock, as well as the mean of the realized returns in the cross-section of firms. The key result here
is that entrepreneurs face risky, but linear, returns to their investment.
The evolution of effective wealth for an entrepreneur is described by:
dwit = [ (1− τKt ) rt kit + (1− τKt )Rt (bit + ht)− cit ] dt+ σ (1− τKt ) kit dzit . (12)
The first term captures the expected rate of growth of effective wealth, and it shows that wealth
grows when the total return to saving for an entrepreneur exceeds consumption expenditures. The
second term captures the impact of idiosyncratic risk. The evolution of effective wealth for a laborer
is described by:
dwit = [ (1− τKt )Rt (bit + ht)− cit ] dt . (13)
Let the fraction of effective wealth an agent saves in the risky asset be:
φit ≡
kit
wit
. (14)
Let an agent’s marginal propensity to consume out of effective wealth be:
mit ≡
cit
wit
. (15)
Let µt = (1 − τKt )rt − (1 − τKt )Rt denote the risk premium. Since investment in capital is risky,
it has to be the case that rt > Rt, otherwise no one would invest in capital. In other words,
agents require a positive risk premium as compensation for undertaking capital investment. Let
ρt ≡ φt (1 − τKt ) rt + (1 − φt) (1 − τKt )Rt denote the net-of-tax mean return to saving for an
entrepreneur, and let ρˆt ≡ ρt − 1/2 γ φ2t σ2 (1− τKt )2 denote the net-of-tax risk-adjusted return to
saving for an entrepreneur. The net-of-tax return to saving for a laborer is simply (1 − τKt )Rt.
Then, since Rt < rt, it has to be that (1− τKt )Rt < ρˆt < ρt < (1− τKt ) rt.
Because of the linearity in assets of the budget constraints (12) and (13), and the homotheticity
of the preferences, the optimal individual policy rules will be linear in total effective wealth, for
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given prices and government policies. Hence, for given prices and policies, an agent’s consumption-
saving problem reduces to a tractable homothetic problem as in Samuelson’s and Merton’s classic
portfolio analysis. Optimal individual behavior is then characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let {ωt, Rt, rt}t∈[0,∞) and {τKt , τLt , Tt, Gt}t∈[0,∞) be equilibrium price and policy
sequences. If an agent i is an entrepreneur, his optimal consumption, investment, portfolio, and
bond holding choices, respectively, are given by:
cit = m
E
t w
i
t, k
i
t = φtw
i
t, φt =
(1− τKt ) rt − (1− τKt )Rt
γ σ2 (1− τKt )2
, bit = (1− φt)wit − ht . (16)
If an agent i is a laborer, his optimal consumption, investment, and bond holding choices, respec-
tively, are given by:
cit = m
L
t w
i
t, k
i
t = 0, b
i
t = w
i
t − ht . (17)
The marginal propensities to consume satisfy the following system of ordinary differential equations:
m˙t
E
mEt
= mEt − θβ + (θ − 1) ρˆt +
θ − 1
1− γ pEL [ (
mL
mE
)
1−γ
1−θ − 1 ] (18)
m˙t
L
mLt
= mLt − θβ + (θ − 1)(1− τKt )Rt +
θ − 1
1− γ pLE [ (
mE
mL
)
1−γ
1−θ − 1 ] . (19)
From (16) and (17) it is clear that optimal consumption is a linear function of total effective
wealth, where the marginal propensity to consume depends only on the type of the agent, and
not on the level of wealth. In other words, all entrepreneurs share a common marginal propensity
to consume, mEt , and all laborers share a common marginal propensity to consume, m
L
t . The
fraction φt of wealth invested in the risky asset by an agent who happens to be an entrepreneur is
increasing in the risk premium, decreasing in risk aversion, and decreasing in the effective variance
of risk, σ(1− τKt ). Because of homotheticity and linearity, φt is the same across all entrepreneurs,
and independent of the level of wealth. The policy for optimal bond holdings follows from (9) or
(10), and (14). The system of (18) and (19) is a system of two Euler equations. It shows that
the marginal propensities to consume, conditional on being an entrepreneur or a laborer, depend
on two factors. First, on the process of the corresponding net-of-tax anticipated (risk-adjusted)
returns to saving, in accordance with whether the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, θ, is
higher or lower than 1. Second, on the probability that the agent might switch between being an
entrepreneur and being a laborer.
3.2 General equilibrium
The initial position of the economy is given by the distribution of (ki0, b
i
0) across households. An
equilibrium is a deterministic sequence of prices {ωt, Rt, rt}t∈[0,∞), a deterministic sequence of poli-
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cies {τKt , τLt , Tt, Gt}t∈[0,∞), a deterministic macroeconomic path {Ct,Kt, Yt, Lt,Wt,WEt ,WLt }t∈[0,∞),
and a collection of individual contingent plans ({cit, lit, kit, bit, wit}t∈[0,∞)) for i ∈ [0, 1], such that the
following conditions hold: (i) given the sequences of prices and policies, the plans are optimal for
the households; (ii) the labor market clears,
∫
i l
i
t = 1, in all t; (iii) the bond market clears,
∫
t b
i
t = 0,
in all t; (iv) the government budget constraint (7) is satisfied in all t; and (v) the aggregates are con-
sistent with individual behavior, Ct =
∫
i c
i
t, Lt =
∫
i l
i
t = 1, Kt =
∫
i k
i
t, Yt =
∫
i F (k
i
t, l
i
t) = F (
∫
i k
i
t, 1),
Wt =
∫
iw
i
t, W
E
t =
∫
i, E w
i
t, and W
L
t =
∫
i, Lw
i
t , in all t.
Because individual consumption and investment are linear in individual wealth, aggregates at
any point in time do not depend on the extend of wealth inequality at that time. Therefore here, in
contrast to other incomplete-markets models, it is not the case that the entire wealth distribution
is a relevant state variable for aggregate dynamics. In fact, for the determination of aggregate
dynamics, it suffices to keep track of the mean of aggregate wealth, and of the allocation of total
wealth between the two groups of agents. To that end, let the fraction of total effective wealth held
by entrepreneurs in the economy be:
λt ≡ W
E
t
Wt
. (20)
The aggregate equilibrium dynamics can then be described by the following recursive system.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the aggregate dynamics satisfy:
W˙t/Wt = λt(ρt −mEt ) + (1− λt)( (1− τKt )Rt −mLt ) (21)
λ˙t/λt = (1− λt)φtµt + (1− λt)(mLt −mEt ) + pLE(
1
λt
− 1)− pEL (22)
H˙t = ( (1− τKt )Rt + v )Ht − (1− τLt )ωt − ( τLt ωt + τKt (FKt − δ )Kt −Gt ) (23)
Kt =
φt λt
1− φt λt Ht , (24)
along with (18) and (19).
Equation (21) shows that the evolution of total effective wealth is a weighted average of two
terms. The first term is positive when the mean net-of-tax return to saving for entrepreneurs
exceeds their marginal propensity to consume, and is weighted by the fraction of total wealth the
entrepreneurs hold in the economy. The second term is positive when the net-of-tax return to
saving for laborers exceeds their marginal propensity to consume, and is weighted by the fraction
of total wealth the laborers hold in the economy. Equation (22) shows the endogenous evolution of
the relative distribution of wealth between the two groups of agents. The evolution of λ depends
on three factors. First, on the differential excess return the entrepreneurs face on their saving,
which is given by φtµt, where φt is the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset, and µt is the
risk premium. Second, on the difference in the level of saving between entrepreneurs and laborers,
as captured by the difference in the marginal propensities to consume, mLt −mEt . Third, on the
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adjustment made for the transition probabilities. Note here that the evolution of consumption
can be recovered by aggregating across individual optimal policies, so that CEt = m
E
t W
E
t and
CLt = m
L
t W
L
t , and using (18), (19), (21), and (22). Equation (23) shows the evolution of total
human wealth, using the government budget constraint Tt = τLt ωt + τ
K
t (FKt − δ )Kt −Gt, where
FKt is the marginal product of capital in the aggregate production function F (K, 1), and where
ωt = FLt(Kt, 1) from market clearing. Since W˙ = K˙ + H˙, the resource constraint of the economy
is also satisfied. Equation (24) is the bond market clearing condition. It comes from aggregating
across individual capital and bond choices as given in (16) and (17), adding up, using BEt +B
L
t = 0,
and using (20). From (24) it follows that, for given prices and human wealth, a decrease in λ
decreases K. A fall in λ indicates that the entrepreneurs on average now borrow more from the
laborers, hence their wealth will on average be lower. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, this
will negatively affect their willingness to take risk, and therefore investment and the capital stock
will fall for given prices.
3.3 Steady state: characterization of aggregates
A steady state is a competitive equilibrium as defined in section 3.2, where prices, policies, and
aggregates are time-invariant. For expositional purposes, and to illustrate that the results about
the effects of capital-income taxation on the aggregates are not due to the presence of two types
of agents or to the probability of death, section 3.3 (as well as section 4 later on) will consider the
case with λ = 1 and v = 011. However, section 3.4 will characterize the invariant distributions for
the general case.
The steady state is the fixed point of the dynamic system in Proposition 2. Let government
spending, G, be parameterized as a fraction g of tax revenue. The following proposition character-
izes the steady state.
Proposition 3. (i) The steady state always exists and is unique. (ii) In steady state, the capital
stock, K, and the interest rate, R, are the solution to:
FK(K)− δ = R+
√
2 θ γ σ2
θ + 1
(β − (1− τK)R ) (25)
K =
φ(K,R)
1− φ(K,R)
(1− τL)ω(K) + (1− g) ( τL ω(K) + τK (FK(K)− δ )K )
(1− τK)R , (26)
where FK(K) is the marginal product of capital and ω(K) is the wage rate in the aggregate economy.
From (18) or (19) and (21) in steady state, and using the fact that φµ = (FK − δ − R)2/γσ2,
we get equation (25). This condition gives the combinations of K and R that are consistent with
11The more general case is left for the appendix.
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wealth and consumption stationarity. Using (24) and (23) in steady state yields equation (26).
This condition gives the combinations of K and R that are consistent with stationarity of human
wealth and bond market clearing.
At this point it is useful to briefly compare the steady state to its complete-markets counterpart.
From (25) note that the difference from complete markets, in which case it would be FK(K)− δ =
R, is the presence of the square-root term, which captures the risk premium, i.e. here µ(R) =√
2 θ γ σ2 (β − (1− τK)R ) / (θ + 1) 6= 0. In other words, agents here require a (private) risk
premium in order to invest in capital. In addition, combining (18) or (19) with (21), and using the
fact that C = mW , we get C˙/C = θ (ρˆt− β) + 12 γ φ2t σ2t (1− τKt )2, from which, in steady state,
we conclude that:
ρˆ = β − 1
2
γ
θ
φ2 σ2 (1− τK)2 . (27)
In other words, the risk-adjusted return to saving must be just low enough to offset the precaution-
ary saving motive,12 which is present here because agents face risk in their consumption stream.
Since (1 − τK)R < ρˆ, it follows that (1 − τK)R < β, i.e. the net interest rate is lower than it
would have been under complete markets. This result is also true in Aiyagari (1994) and in other
Bewley-type models, with the difference that in Bewley models it is labor-income that introduces
the risk in the consumption stream. Furthermore here, because FK − δ > R, it could be the case
either that FK − δ > β or FK − δ < β. Hence, capital can be either lower or higher than under
complete markets.13 This is in contrast to the effects of labor-income risk on steady-state capital,
and it is due to the fact that idiosyncratic investment risk introduces a wedge (the risk premium)
between the return to the risky asset and the return to the riskless asset.
3.4 Steady state: characterization of invariant distributions
At each point in time, agents die and are replaced by newborn agents, and the assumption is that
the newborn agents are endowed with the wealth of the exiting agents.14 This force generates mean
reversion and guarantees the existence of an invariant wealth distribution. Let ξit ≡ wit/Wt denote
the distance between individual and aggregate effective wealth. Let ΦL and ΦE be the condi-
tional invariant distributions for laborers and entrepreneurs respectively. The following proposition
characterizes the invariant distributions.
12If the risk-adjusted return were higher than this critical level, consumption (and wealth) would increase over time
without bound, which would be a contradiction of steady state. Conversely, if the risk-adjusted return were lower
than this level, consumption (and wealth) would shrink to zero, which would once again be a contradiction of steady
state.
13Angeletos (2007) gives a condition that determines whether steady-state capital is higher or lower than under
complete markets, and quantifies the effects of idiosyncratic capital-income risk on steady-state aggregates.
14Hence, from a law of large numbers, each agent starts life with the sum of human wealth plus the mean wealth
in the economy.
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Proposition 4. The conditional invariant distributions ΦL and ΦE are characterized by the fol-
lowing second order linear differential system:
0 = κ1 ξ
∂ΦL
∂ξ
+ κ2 ΦL + pEL ΦE ,
0 = κ3 ξ2
∂2ΦE
∂ξ2
+ κ4 ξ
∂ΦE
∂ξ
+ κ5 ΦE + pLE ΦL ,
where κ1, κ2, κ3, κ4, κ5 are constants determined by steady-state aggregates.
The point to note here is that the tractability of the model allows for a very detailed charac-
terization of the invariant distributions. This is particularly useful for the case of entrepreneurs,
since it is reasonable to expect that the distribution of wealth over entrepreneurs will be, to a large
extent, determined by the realization of entrepreneurial returns.15
4 Steady-State Effects of Capital Taxation
This section presents the core of the contribution of this paper, which is the study of the steady-
state effects of capital-income taxation. Again, for illustration purposes, the assumption is that
λ = 1 and v = 0. The main result here is that an increase in the capital-income tax may actually
increase investment and the steady-state capital stock. This possibility arises because of the general-
equilibrium effects of the insurance aspect of capital taxation, which operate mainly through the
endogenous adjustment of the interest rate. In order to illustrate this, the analysis will proceed by
making the distinction between the case where the interest rate is fixed, and the case where the
interest rate is allowed to adjust endogenously.
Note then that equation (25) expresses capital, K, as a function of the tax, τK , and the interest
rate, R. If the interest rate were fixed,16 then the steady-state capital stock would be Ko(τK , R),
as given by (25), and where both τK and R are exogenous. Next, by plugging Ko(τK , R) from (25)
into (26), we can solve for the closed-economy steady-state interest rate, as a function of the capital-
income tax. Let R c(τK) denote the closed-economy solution for the interest rate. It follows then,
that the closed-economy steady-state capital stock will be given by Kc(τK) = Ko(τK , R c(τK)).
Hence, the impact of the capital-income tax on the closed economy steady-state capital stock
can be decomposed in two parts. The first part describes how steady-state capital changes with
the tax when the interest rate is kept constant or exogenously fixed. The second part describes
the general-equilibrium adjustment of the interest rate in the closed economy, and the subsequent
15Whereas the tractability of the aggregates follows from Angeletos (2007), the result about the tractability of the
invariant distributions is novel to the present paper.
16This would be the case, for example, in a (small) open-economy version of the present model. This would be
an economy with the same preferences, technologies, and risks, but which is open to an international market for the
riskless bond, thus facing an exogenously fixed interest rate.
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effects of this adjustment on capital accumulation. Thus, the total effect of the capital-income tax
on the closed-economy steady-state capital stock can be decomposed as follows:
dKc
dτK
=
∂ Ko
∂ τK
+
∂ Ko
∂ R
dR c
d τK
, (28)
where the first term is the effect when the interest rate is fixed, and the second term is the effect
when the interest rate is allowed to adjust, i.e. it is the closed-economy or general-equilibrium
effect.
Let’s first turn to the fixed-interest rate effect. The following corollary characterizes the effect
of capital-income taxation on capital accumulation when the interest rate is held constant.
Corollary 1. When the interest rate is exogenously fixed, an increase in the capital-income tax
unambiguously reduces the steady-state capital stock, i.e. ∂ Ko/∂ τK < 0.
This result follows immediately from (25), for a given R. Hence, when the interest rate is kept
constant, capital falls with the tax, despite a direct insurance aspect of the tax that is still present,
namely that the tax reduces the variance of net returns, σ(1−τK). Clearly then, for a given interest
rate, this channel is not strong enough to outweigh the distortionary effect of capital taxation on
investment. This result stands in contrast to the findings of Ahsan (1974). Ahsan considers the
simultaneous determination of the size and the composition of the optimal portfolio, in a two-period
model with exogenous returns. He shows that the effect of an increase in capital-income taxation
on risk-taking and capital is in general ambiguous.17 The result here indicates that, once Ahsan’s
setting is extended to incorporate endogenous capital return and infinite horizon, the ambiguity
disappears and capital taxation always leads to a fall in the steady-state capital stock. It is then
clear that, in addition to the direct insurance role of the tax, the endogenous adjustment of the
interest rate is also required for the effect of capital taxation on capital to become ambiguous once
again.
Let’s now turn to the general-equilibrium effect, which captures the fact that in the closed
economy the interest rate endogenously adjusts to clear the bond market, according to equation
(26). This effect further consists of two parts.
First, an increase in the capital-income tax reduces the effective volatility of risk for en-
trepreneurs, σ(1 − τK), and this is the direct insurance effect mentioned above. As a result,
the interest rate, which is below the discount rate in steady state, increases, essentially because of
a reduction in the demand for precautionary saving, i.e. dR c/d τK > 0.18 In fact, the increase in
17Ahsan’s result is, in turn, a generalization of Stiglitz (1969), who examines the effects of proportional capital-
income taxation in a two-period model, taking not only returns, but also the level of saving as exogenously given.
18This intuitive result has not been proven in the context of the infinite horizon model, although a proof is available
for the two period version of the closed economy, for small τK . There, it can be shown in closed-form that steady-
state capital is inversely U-shaped with respect to the capital-income tax. Nonetheless, simulations show that in
the infinite-horizon closed-economy model the net interest rate is always increasing in the tax, as section 6.1 will
demonstrate.
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the interest rate is so high, that the net interest rate, R(1 − τK), ends up increasing, despite the
increase in the capital-income tax.
Second, this increase in the (net) interest rate will generate two opposing effects on saving
and wealth accumulation, as can be seen from (25). On the one hand, an increase in the interest
rate increases the opportunity cost of capital, and thus it tends to lower the steady-state capital
stock. On the other hand, an increase in the interest rate tends to increase the return to saving,
and hence the steady-state wealth of entrepreneurs. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, this
increases entrepreneurs’ willingness to take risk, and hence it is a force that tends to increase the
steady-state capital stock. This second effect is due to the fact that here investment is sensitive to
wealth, a mechanism which is absent when markets are complete. In other words, agents require a
(private) risk premium in order to invest in capital, but this premium is lower at higher levels of
wealth.19 Therefore, the overall effect of an increase in R on K is ambiguous, as is summarized in
the following corollary.
Corollary 2. When the interest rate is taken to be exogenous, ∂ Ko/∂ R ⇔ θ > φ/(1− φ).
The proof for this corollary also follows from equation (25), and is left for the appendix. The
intuition behind this result is a bit convoluted, so it is worth examining step-by-step. Combining
equations (18) or (19) and (21) in steady state, we get:
ρ + (θ − 1) ρˆ = θβ , (29)
where ρ is the mean return to saving, and ρˆ is the risk adjusted return, both evaluated at the
steady-state K and for given R. Of course, this condition is equivalent to (25), but it is more useful
for developing intuition.
Note first that an increase in K necessarily reduces ρ+ (θ− 1)ρˆ. This is because an increase in
K reduces f ′ (K), and, for given φ, this reduces ρ and ρˆ equally, thus also reducing ρ + (θ − 1)ρˆ.
Of course, the optimal φ must also fall, but this only reinforces the negative effect on ρ (since the
portfolio is shifted towards the low-return bond), while it does not affect ρˆ (because of the envelope
theorem and the fact that φ maximizes ρˆ).
Note next that an increase in R has an ambiguous effect on ρ + (θ − 1)ρˆ. This is because, for
given φ, both ρ and ρˆ increase with R, but now the decrease in φ works in the opposite direction,
contributing to lower ρ. Intuitively, though, this effect should be small if φ was small to begin with.
Moreover, the impact of ρˆ is likely to dominate if θ is high enough. Therefore, ρ + (θ − 1)ρˆ is
expected to increase with R if and only if either φ is low or θ is high.
19To see this wealth effect more clearly, note that we can use (23) and (25) to write steady-state human wealth as
H(R) = H(K(R)). Then, by bond market clearing, steady-state aggregate wealth is W (R) = K(R) + H(R). The
appendix20 shows that W ′(R) > 0 ⇔ µ′(R) < µ < 0. But from (25) it is easy to show that µ′′(R) < 0. Hence,
W ′(R) > 0 ⇔ µ′(R) < µ ⇔ R > R. In other words, when the interest rate is above a certain threshold, then an
increase in the interest rate increases aggregate steady-state wealth.
16
Combining these two observations leads to the conclusion that steady-state K increases with R
if and only if θ > φ/(1−φ). As shown in section 3.3, this condition is more likely to be satisfied when
R is sufficiently high, since the steady-state risk premium is a decreasing function of R. Intuitively,
when R is close to β, a marginal increase in R has such a strong positive effect on steady-state
wealth, that the consequent reduction in the risk premium more than offsets the increase in the
opportunity cost of investment, ensuring that K increases with R.
The following proposition now summarizes the discussion above and the main result of this
section.
Proposition 5. If θ > φ/(1 − φ) and dR c/d τK sufficiently high, then dKc/dτK > 0, i.e. the
closed-economy steady-state capital stock is increasing in the capital-income tax.
In order to assess the empirical relevance of the relationship θ > φ/(1 − φ), one can use a
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation that does not require any reference to the degree of market
incompleteness, σ. In particular, take labor income to be 65% of GDP, and take the safe rate to be
2%. Then, steady-state H is about 33 times GDP, or 11 times K, if the steady-state capital-output
ratio is taken to be 3. Hence, φ/(1 − φ) = K/H = 0.1, which, as section 5 will discuss, is lower
than most of the empirical estimates of θ that use micro data for the United States. Hence, in all
likelihood, the condition θ > φ/(1 − φ) is satisfied in the data. At the same time, a high positive
value for dR c/d τK is intuitive, considering the (insurance) effect of the tax on the demand for
precautionary saving.
It is therefore possible that, although ∂ Ko/∂ τK < 0, it could still be that dKc/dτK > 0 over
some region, since ∂ Ko/∂ R · dR c/d τK > 0 is very likely positive. This means that the general-
equilibrium effect of insurance on the adjustment of the interest rate, and the subsequent effect
of this adjustment on wealth accumulation, is crucial for overthrowing the negative effect of the
capital-income tax on capital when the interest rate is fixed. The next sections will demonstrate
how, for empirically plausible parameter values, this general-equilibrium effect will produce the
counter-intuitive result that increases in the capital-income tax will at first increase steady-state
capital, even with the fixed interest-rate effect working in the opposite direction.
5 Calibration and Steady-State Implications
For the quantitative part of the paper, the benchmark model analyzed so far is extended to include
endogenous labor. Preferences are assumed homothetic between consumption, c and leisure, n,
according to the King-Plosser-Rebelo (1988) specification, and they are defined as the limit, for
∆t→ 0, of:
Ut = { (1− e−β∆t) (c1−ψt nψt )1−1/θ + e−β∆t ( Et[U1−γt+∆t ] )
1−1/θ
1−γ } 11−1/θ . (30)
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The appendix presents all proofs for the general case of endogenous labor. Note also that the
calibration will treat the case with two types of agents, i.e. there will be both entrepreneurs and
laborers in the model. This section will present the benchmark calibration, and will examine its
implication for the steady-state aggregates and wealth distributions. The next section will then
focus on the effects of capital-income taxation for aggregates and welfare.
5.1 Simulations
The dynamic system described in Proposition 2, and generalized to the case of endogenous labor,
is highly tractable compared to other incomplete-markets models, where the entire wealth distribu-
tion is a relevant state variable for aggregate equilibrium dynamics. The steady state of the system
is found by setting the dynamics of all equations in Proposition 2 to zero. The algorithm first solves
for the steady-state aggregates, which are deterministic and characterized by Proposition 3. Sub-
sequently, for any historically given (K0, χ0, XE0 ), where χ0 is the initial measure of entrepreneurs
in the economy, and XE0 is the historically given financial wealth of the entrepreneur group, and
using as boundary conditions the steady state values of (H,mE ,mL), it integrates backward until
the path of (Kt, λt, Ht,mEt ,m
L
t ) is close enough to its steady-state value.
The method of finite differences is used on the general version of the system in Proposition 4.
The first and second derivatives of the invariant distributions are replaced by their discrete time
approximations. The only conditions imposed are that the probability density functions integrate to
one, and that they do not explode to the right. The emerging functions ΦL and ΦE are well-behaved
and stable.
Subsequently, Monte-Carlo simulations are performed. The processes of dying, of type-switching,
and of the idiosyncratic capital-income shocks, are simulated using random number generators for
series of 200,000 households and 100,000 years. The wealth distributions generated converge to
those produced by the finite-differences method, and their variances are stable as time increases.
Finally, using these distributions, welfare calculations are performed.
5.2 Parameter choice
The economy is parameterized by (α, β, γ, δ, θ, σ, ψ, v, pEL, pLE , τK , τL, G). Table 1 presents
the parameter choices for the preferred benchmark model calibration.
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Parameters Values
Preferences
β 0.024
γ 8
θ 1
ψ 0.75
Technology
α 0.40
δ 0.06
Probabilities
v 0.0067
pEL 0.18
pLE 0.025
Government
τK 0.25
τL 0.35
G/GDP 0.20
Risk
σ 0.15
Table 1. Benchmark Calibration Values.
The parameter values chosen refer to annual data from the United States. The discount rate is
β = 0.024. The preference parameter is ψ = 0.75, which is standard in the macro literature21. The
income share of capital is α = 0.40. The depreciation rate is δ = 0.06. The probability of death is
chosen to be v = 1/150, a compromise between having an empirically relevant probability of death
and allowing for some altruism across generations. The probability of exiting entrepreneurship
is pEL = 0.18. The probability of entering entrepreneurship is pLE = 0.025. These two values
were estimated from the PSID and SCF data, and subsequently used for calibrations, by Quadrini
(2000). In Quadrini’s model, as well as here, they imply a fraction of entrepreneurs in the total
population of 12%,22 which is in line with the data, as Quadrini and Cagetti and DeNardi (2006)
document.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is chosen to be θ = 1. The empirical estimates of
the EIS vary a lot. Using aggregate British data and correcting for aggregation bias, Attanasio and
Weber (1993) estimate θ to be about 0.7. Although the exact estimates from micro data vary across
studies and specifications, in most cases they are around 1, especially for agents at the top layers
21For example, King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
22The proof can be found in Lemma 3 of the appendix.
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of wealth and asset holdings. For example, using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) and an Epstein-Zin specification, as in the present paper, Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio
(2003) report baseline estimates between 1 and 1.4 for stockholders.
The proportional tax on capital income is τK = 0.25. The Congressional Budget Office Back-
ground Paper (December 2006) reports that the average marginal rate at which corporate profits
are taxed is 35%, whereas the average marginal rate at which non-corporate business income is
taxed is around 26% − 27%. The CRS Report for Congress (October 2003) details the capital in-
come tax revisions and effective tax rates due to provisions granted through bonus depreciations of
30% or 50%. If these provisions are taken into account, the average marginal capital income tax is
between 20%− 25% for non-corporate businesses and between 25%− 30% for corporate businesses.
The value of τK = 0.25 is chosen to be in the middle of these estimates.23 The proportional tax on
labor income is τL = 0.35. The Congressional Budget Office Background Paper (December 2006)
reports that the median effective marginal tax rate on labor income is 32%, inclusive of federal,
state and payroll taxes.24 Incorporating the distortionary effect of social security taxes would fur-
ther increase this number, hence the choice made here. The level of government spending, G, is
chosen so that the steady-state government-spending-to-GDP ratio is 20%.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is chosen to be γ = 8. The empirical estimation of γ is
a complicated task, because, as Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio (2003) detail, it requires making
additional assumptions about the covariance of consumption growth with stock returns, the share
of stocks in the financial wealth portfolio, the properties of the expected returns to human capital,
and the share of human capital in overall wealth. Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX),
Vissing-Jørgensen and Attanasio find estimates of risk aversion for stockholders in the range of
5−10, but with a broader sample and under different assumptions these estimates go up to 20−30.
They also compare their results to Campbell (1996), who estimates γ in the range of 17 − 25,
using data on monthly and annual returns, and assuming that the entire financial portfolio is
held in stocks. Alan and Browning (2008), use the PSID data to structurally estimate the joint
distribution of discount factors and relative risk aversion coefficients. They find that the lower
educated households are less risk averse than the more educated households, and that the medians
of the two relative risk aversion distributions are 6.2 and 8.4 respectively. Guiso and Paiella (2005),
using data from the 1995 Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth, estimate direct
measures of risk aversion based on the maximum price a consumer is willing to pay to buy a risky
asset. They find that the median relative risk aversion is 6, if consumers have a one-year horizon, and
it is 16, if they have a lifetime horizon. Dohmen et el. (2005) present evidence on the distribution
of risk attitudes in the population, using survey questions and a representative sample of 22, 000
individuals living in Germany. The behavioral relevance of their survey is tested by conducting a
23Altig et al. (2001) report a proportional capital income tax of 20% at the federal level, but they also subject
capital income to a 3.7% state tax.
24This number is also reported by Jokisch and Kotlikoff (2006).
20
complementary field experiment, based on a representative sample, and the conclusion is that the
survey measure is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. They find that the bulk of the
mass in the γ-distribution is located between 1 − 10. There is, however, a non-negligible mass of
estimates in the range of higher values, up to 20. Barsky et al. (1997) measure risk aversion based
on survey responses by participants in the Health and Retirement Study to hypothetical situations.
They find that most individuals fall in the category that has mean relative risk aversion of 15.8.
Cohen and Einav (2005) use a data set of 100,000 individuals’ deductible choices in auto insurance
contracts, to estimate the distribution of risk preferences. They find that the 82nd percentile in
the distribution of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is about 13− 15.25
The volatility coefficient is chosen to be σ = 0.15. The empirical estimation of the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial returns is a very difficult task, and has not as yet received
much attention in the literature. So far, the most thorough attempt to measure idiosyncratic risk
is by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and is at the cross-sectional level. Using the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) data, they document poor diversification and extreme concentration
of entrepreneurial investment, significant heterogeneity in individual investment choices, and high
risk at the individual level due to high bankruptcy rates. However, because of the problems arising
when imputing labor income, and because of the lack of sufficient time dimension in the data, they
cannot provide an accurate estimate of the volatility of entrepreneurial returns for unincorporated
businesses. In the end, they conjecture that the volatility of returns for private firms cannot be lower
than the corresponding volatility of publicly traded firms, which the find to be about 0.5 per annum.
This number is also used in calibrations by Bitler et al. (2005), and by Roussanov (2009). On the
other hand, Benhabib and Zhu (2008) use a value of 0.26.26 The point to note here is that, because
of the lack of an accurate measure, the finance literature attempting to quantify entrepreneurial
risk has used plausible but arbitrary magnitudes for the private rate-of-return volatility.
An indirect estimate for the private-sector volatility could be motivated by the work of Davis
et al. (2006), who use the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), containing annual observations
on employment and payroll for all establishments and firms in the private sector, to estimate the
volatility of employment growth rates. They find that, in 2001, the ratio of private to public
volatility was in the range 1.43−1.75. Given that the average annual standard deviation for public
firms over 1990− 1997 was 0.11,27 and that there is, at least in the context of the present model, a
close relationship between volatility of profits and volatility of labor demand, the choice of σ = 0.15
could also be justified from this perspective.
25Attanasio et al. (2002) also provide evidence of considerable heterogeneity in the point estimates of the relative
risk aversion coefficient, using data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey over 1978-1995. Estimates of relative
risk aversion in the range of 10 have also been reported by Pa´lsson (1999), who uses Swedish cross-sectional data
from tax returns in 1985.
26This choice gives a volatility of the return to the risky asset three times as large as the (exogenous) mean return
to the risky asset.
27As reported in Campbell et al. (2001).
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As additional support for the choice of σ = 0.15, it is noted that this magnitude generates an
annual variance for steady-state consumption growth in the range indicated by the micro data,
once consumer heterogeneity is taken into account.28
29
Parameters γ and σ are especially important for the calibrated model, for two reasons. First,
they directly influence λ, the fraction of wealth held by entrepreneurs in the economy. And then, for
example, as mentioned in section 3.2, when λ falls, i.e. when the entrepreneurs borrow more from
the laborers, then, for given prices, K falls as well.30 Given this importance of λ, the calibrated
model’s implications about λ are a good criterion of model performance. As will be shown in
section 5.3, the choices γ = 8 and σ = 0.15, which seem empirically relevant given the discussion
above, produce, without an attempt to match it, a value for λ that is reasonably close to the values
documented in the data. Second, parameters γ and σ relate to the interpretation of the capital-
income tax as providing insurance. For this reason, comparative statics will also be performed,
in section 6, to show how the tax that maximizes the steady-state capital stock varies with risk
aversion and the volatility of risk. The main result, that steady-state capital is inversely U-shaped
with respect to the capital-income tax, is preserved qualitatively for σ ∈ (0, 1) and for γ ∈ (2, 20].
5.3 Implications for steady-state aggregates and distributions
This section undertakes the examination of the quantitative performance of the model in terms
of aggregates and wealth distributions, for three reasons. First, to show how wealth inequality is
influenced by the random-walk component introduced in wealth by the idiosyncratic investment risk.
Second, to demonstrate how wealth inequality depends on the excess returns to entrepreneurship,
which is an important question in its own right, but also in view of the impact of agent heterogeneity
on capital accumulation. Third, to provide some additional confidence in the main quantitative
results presented in the next section (section 6) about the effects of capital-income taxation on
capital accumulation, by showing that the model performs well in matching aspects of the US
aggregate and welfare data.
Table 2 presents the implications of the model for steady-state aggregates, and compares them
to the data from the US economy. The model’s capital-output ratio is 2.8. Investment is 17% of
GDP. The safe rate is 2.5%. The steady-state fraction of entrepreneurs, χss, is 12%, and it matches
the data by choice of the transition probabilities, as explained in section 5.2. Entrepreneurs hold
28For example, Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2001), and Malloy et al. (2006).
29It is to be noted though, that their analysis focuses on the differences in the cross-sectional volatility facing
private entrepreneurs. But what really matters in the present model is the investment volatility an entrepreneur faces
over time, since the time dimension is the one relevant for capital accumulation. For this time dimension, Panousi and
Papanikolaou (2008) find that the mean annual idiosyncratic investment volatility is approximately 0.4 for publicly
traded firms in the US.
30This result also carries over to the steady-state analysis. For example, when λ 6= 1, then, for θ = 1, equation
(25) takes the form FK(K)− δ = R+
√
λ(R)−1 γ σ2 (β − (1− τK)R ), where λ = (β − (1− τK)R+ pLE)/(β − (1−
τK)R+ pLE + pEL). From this it is clear that, for given R, an increase in λ leads to a fall in steady-state K.
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30% of total wealth in the economy, where the equivalent of λ in the data is the ratio XE/X31.
The share of total wealth held by entrepreneurs in the data ranges between 35% − 55%. The
model-generated value for λ is an indication that the model performs reasonably well, especially
given the low value of σ used in the calibration, and also since the rest of the aggregates could
have been matched by a standard neoclassical growth model. The fraction of entrepreneurs in the
top 10% of the population is 18% in the model, whereas in the data this number ranges between
32%− 54%.32
K/Y I/Y G/Y R χss XE/X χss in top 10%
US Data 2.7 17% 20% 2% 10− 19% 35− 55% 32− 54%
Model 2.8 17% 20% 2.5% 12% 30% 18%
Table 2. Steady-State Aggregates.
Next, Table 3 examines the wealth distribution generated by the model. The first two rows
present the percentiles for wealth computed by Quadrini (2000), using the PSID and SCF samples
for 1994 and 1992, respectively. The last row is the conditional wealth distribution of the benchmark
calibrated model.33
Top Percentiles
30% 20% 10% 5% 1%
SCF 87.6 79.5 66.1 53.5 29.5
PSID 85.9 75.9 59.1 44.8 22.6
Model 76.25 63.68 44.44 29.80 10.53
Table 3. Distribution of Wealth in the US and in the Model.
Aiyagari’s (1994) benchmark calibration predictions for the wealth holdings of the top 5%
and the top 1% of the population are 13.1% and 3.2%, respectively. Hence, the present model
demonstrates how the random-walk component introduced in wealth by entrepreneurial risk helps
generate a fatter right tail in the wealth distribution.34
31This is because, in the data, wealth is defined as total net worth, i.e. it is financial wealth, X, as defined in the
present model, plus housing.
32The data on entrepreneurs and wealth concentration is as reported in Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
33Compared to the data, the model’s unconditional wealth distribution has a larger fraction of agents at negative
levels of wealth, most likely because of the absence of borrowing constraints.
34A tractable extension that could improve the model’s prediction about wealth concentration at the top would be
to introduce a third state, in which an agent gets to be an entrepreneur operating a very high return or very low risk
production function. Then, the transition probabilities between the three states can be freely chosen to match desired
moments of the wealth distribution. In particular, making the good entrepreneurial state the least persistent and the
most likely to transition to the state of being a laborer would increase the precautionary saving, and therefore the
wealth concentration, of the very rich agents.
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Next, Figure 1 plots the Lorenz curves for the model’s aggregate wealth and consumption
distributions. The model produces results in the right direction, in that the distribution of wealth
over the population is much more unequal than the distribution of consumption. The model’s Gini
coefficient for wealth, conditional on wealth being positive, is 0.62. The model’s Gini coefficient
for consumption is 0.15.35 In the data, the Gini coefficient for total net worth is 0.8, and the Gini
coefficient for consumption is 0.32.
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Figure 1: Lorenz Curves for Wealth and Consumption
Finally, Figure 2 presents the model’s conditional wealth distributions over entrepreneurs and
laborers. On the horizontal axis is wealth normalized by mean annual income in the economy. On
the vertical axis are frequencies. The solid line represents entrepreneurs, and the dashed line labor-
ers. Consistent with the data, the distribution of wealth for the population of entrepreneurs displays
a fatter tail than the one for laborers. This is due to the random-walk component that the unin-
surable investment risk introduces into entrepreneurial wealth. Furthermore, the entrepreneurial
wealth distribution is shifted to the right, and it has lower frequencies at lower levels of wealth. This
is due to the higher mean return of the total entrepreneurial portfolio. Finally, the distributions
of wealth for both groups have significant mass of people with wealth higher than fifty times mean
35The differences in the Gini coefficients are due to the presence of human wealth: since poorer agents have higher
human-to-financial-wealth ratios, they can sustain relatively high consumption. This would not be the case in the
presence of borrowing constraints.
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income. In the model, the laborers at the right tail of the wealth distribution are former successful
entrepreneurs.
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Figure 2: Wealth Distribution for Entrepreneurs and Laborers
6 Macroeconomic Effects of Capital-Income Taxation
This section now proceeds to study the macroeconomic effects of capital-income taxation under
the benchmark calibration, where the relevant parameters are those of Table 1. Section 6.1 exam-
ines the steady-state effects of capital-income taxation. Section 6.2 examines the implications for
macroeconomic aggregates of eliminating the capital-income tax.
6.1 Steady state
This section quantifies the main theoretical result of the paper, which is that an increase in the
capital-income tax increases the steady-state capital stock, when the tax is low enough. As already
explained, this result is due to the general-equilibrium effect of the insurance aspect of the capital-
income tax, and it operates mainly through the endogenous adjustment of the interest rate.
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Figure 3: Steady State and Capital-Income Taxation
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the steady-state aggregates with respect to the capital-income
tax. Capital (panel (a)) and output (panel (b)) are inversely-U shaped with respect to the capital-
income tax, and they reach a maximum when τK = 0.4. The same is true for employment, the
capital-labor (capital per work-hour) ratio, and output per work-hour. At τK = 0.4, steady-state
capital per work-hour is 6.75% higher than when τK = 0, and output per work-hour is 2.65%
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higher.
Figure 3(c) shows that the net interest rate increases with the tax, and that it tends to the
discount rate, β = 0.024, as τK → 1. This is the demonstration of the precautionary saving
motive mentioned in section 4: when the capital-income tax increases, the effective volatility of risk
facing an entrepreneur decreases, which reduces the demand for precautionary saving, and therefore
increases the interest rate. Figure 3(d) reinforces this interpretation of the capital-income tax as
providing insurance: when the tax increases, the precautionary saving motive becomes weaker, and
therefore entrepreneurs are satisfied with a lower risk premium. Figure 3(e) shows that the fraction
of wealth held by entrepreneurs in the economy is decreasing in the capital-income tax. This results
from the combination of the weaker precautionary saving motive, and the fall in the risk premium.
At this point, it is useful to compare the effects of capital-income taxation in the present model
to those under complete markets, where there is no scope for insurance (assuming that agents are
homogeneous), as well as to those in the open economy version of the model, where only the direct
insurance aspect of the tax is present. As already mentioned, here, at τK = 0.4, steady-state
capital per work-hour and output per work-hour are 6.75% and 2.65%, respectively, higher than
when τK = 0. By contrast, under complete markets,36 at τK = 0.4, steady-state capital per work-
hour and output per work-hour are 25% and 11% lower than when τK = 0. And finally, in the
open-economy version of the model the aggregates fall all the way with the tax, but less so than
under complete markets. In particular, at τK = 0.4, steady-state capital per work-hour and output
per work-hour are 14% and 6% lower than when τK = 0.
Finally, in order to reinforce the insurance interpretation of the tax system, Figure 4 presents
robustness checks with respect to volatility, σ, and risk aversion, γ. On the vertical axis is the
tax that maximizes the steady-state capital stock. When either the volatility of risk increases or
risk aversion increases, the tax that maximizes the steady-state capital stock increases. These
comparative statics also indicate that the main result of the paper is robust to the wide range of
empirically plausible values of σ ∈ (0, 1) and of γ ∈ (2, 20]. In particular, for the low value of
σ = 0.15, the capital-income tax that maximizes the steady-state capital stock is positive for all
γ > 2, and it is actually zero when γ = 2.
36The complete-markets calibration uses the relevant parameter values from the benchmark Table 1.
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Figure 4: Robustness Checks
6.2 Aggregate dynamics of eliminating the capital-income tax
This section presents the immediate and long-run responses of the aggregate variables to the policy
reform that eliminates the capital-income tax, taking into account the entire transitional path of
the economy towards the new steady state with the zero tax. In the standard representative-
agent complete-markets neoclassical model, the optimal capital-income tax is zero in the long run,
as well as in most of the short run for an interesting class of preferences. These findings have
initiated an extensive debate as to the possible benefits of eliminating the tax on capital income.
By contrast, the main result of the present paper is that an increase in the capital-income tax may
actually increase the steady-state capital stock. In light of this result, it is worthwhile to revisit
the discussion on the implications of setting the capital-income tax to zero.
The present model can in fact examine the dynamic implications of policy reforms, because it is
very tractable, compared to other incomplete-markets models, where the entire wealth distribution
is a relevant state variable. Here, only the mean of the wealth distribution is relevant for aggregate
dynamics, which constitutes a significant gain in tractability, and allows for the entire dynamic
response of the economy, after a policy change, to be considered. This is important, since it has by
now been recognized that the immediate effects of a policy change may well be very different from
its long-run effects.
Here, the economy starts from the steady state described by the benchmark calibration pa-
rameters in Table 1, where the capital-income tax is τK = 0.25. Subsequently, the tax is set to
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zero, ceteris paribus. Table 4 shows the response of the aggregates on the impact of the policy
reform (denoted by Current), as well as at the new steady state (denoted by Long Run), under
both complete markets and the present model of incomplete markets. The effects on the interest
rate, R, the risk premium, µ, and the investment-output ratio, I/Y , are in percentage units. The
rest of the numbers denote percentage changes.
Current Long Run
Incomplete Complete Incomplete Complete
L −2.98 8.94 −0.0477 1.43
Y −1.80 5.27 −2.12 7.77
C 2.48 −5.52 −2.06 5.87
Y/L 1.22 −3.37 −2.08 6.25
I/Y −3.16 6.44 −0.52 2.48
Rnet −1.21 1.29 −0.13 0
Table 4. Dynamics of Eliminating the Capital-Income Tax.
Under complete markets, a permanent (unanticipated) tax cut leads to an immediate negative
jump in consumption and an immediate positive jump in investment. Capital slowly increases
and converges to a higher steady-state value, while consumption is initially lower and increases
over time. In other words, the long-run increase in investment requires an initial period of lower
consumption, which in turn allows for an immediate increase in investment as well. By contrast,
under incomplete markets, the exact opposite is the case. In light of the main mechanism of the
paper, investment decreases in the long run. This allows for an immediate increase in consumption,
and therefore necessitates a fall in current investment. In particular, the investment-output ratio
falls by more than 3 percentage units. These effects are also illustrated in Figure 5, which plots
the impulse responses of the variables when the capital-income tax is eliminated.
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Figure 5: Dynamics of Incomplete vs. Complete Markets: Eliminating the Capital-Income Tax
7 Welfare Effects of Capital-Income Taxation
This section studies the welfare effects of capital-income taxation under the benchmark calibration,
where again the relevant parameters are those of Table 1. Note that, under complete markets,
steady-state welfare is decreasing in the level of the capital-income tax. However, this result will be
upset here due the insurance aspect (both direct and indirect) of capital-income taxation. Section
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7.1 examines the steady-state welfare effects of the capital-income tax. Section 7.2 examines the
dynamic welfare effects of eliminating the capital-income tax. These welfare effects will be examined
from two perspectives. On the one hand, one might be interested in examining the welfare of the
current generation immediately after the policy reform, taking into account the entire transitional
dynamics of the economy towards the new steady state with the zero tax. On the other hand, one
might be interested in examining the welfare of the generations that will be alive in the distant
future, i.e. at the new steady state in the long run. In the latter case, for example, an interpretation
of aggregate welfare is that it is the ex ante utility of the agents who are going to be assigned to
the stationary wealth distribution.37
7.1 Steady state
In steady state, as shown in Figure 3(f), aggregate welfare is maximized at τK = 0.7, whether for
entrepreneurs (solid line), laborers (dashed line), or the economy as a whole (dotted line).38 This
is because of the combined direct insurance effect of the tax, through the reduction in σ(1− τK),
and the effect of the tax on aggregates. It is worth noting that in the open-economy version of the
model steady-state welfare is maximized when τK = 0.4, which reflects solely the direct insurance
aspect of the tax.
7.2 Welfare dynamics of eliminating the capital-income tax
The welfare implications of eliminating the capital-income tax are represented here in terms of a
compensating differential for each level of wealth and each type of agent, whether entrepreneur or
laborer. In particular, starting from the old regime with τK = 0.25, the question is what fraction
of his financial wealth would an agent be willing to give up in order to avoid the impact of the new
regime initiated by the policy change, either immediately or in the long run.
Figure 6 presents the welfare implications of abolishing the capital-income tax for entrepreneurs
(solid line) and laborers (dashed line). Panel (a) shows the welfare implications for the current
generation, taking into account the entire transitional dynamics of the economy towards the new
steady-state, and panel (b) shows the welfare implications for the generations alive at the new
steady state. Financial wealth normalized by annual mean income is on the horizontal axis, and
the compensating differentials are on the vertical axis. A negative number on the vertical axis
indicates an agent who benefits from the reform: the agent would have to be paid to be indifferent
37The welfare effects are more likely to be sensitive to the assumption that the insurance possibilities are exogenously
fixed. For example, in a richer model, there might be important welfare implications coming from the interaction
between the insurance effects of capital taxation and the insurance endogenously provided by private markets. Still,
the welfare implications of capital taxation are worth exploring here, especially since they will reveal how general
equilibrium mechanisms in particular can affect different types of agents differently.
38Naturally, entrepreneur welfare is higher than laborer welfare for all tax levels. In addition, entrepreneur welfare
is higher than laborer welfare for all levels of wealth, since entrepreneurs are unconstrained in their investment choices.
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between the old regime and the regime initiated by the impact of the policy change, hence the
agent prefers the new regime with the zero capital-income tax.
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Figure 6: Welfare Implications of Eliminating the Capital-Income Tax
Figure 6(a) shows that current-generation poor agents, whether entrepreneurs or laborers, prefer
the zero capital-income tax regime. As wealth increases, both entrepreneurs and laborers prefer
the positive capital-income tax regime. Finally, the mean cost of eliminating the tax is higher for
the middle-class agents than for the very rich. Figure 6(b) shows that, in the long run, both types
of agents and at all wealth levels prefer the steady state with the positive tax, the rich less so than
the poor, and the entrepreneurs less so than the laborers. Table 5 presents these welfare benefits (if
negative) and costs (if positive) of τK = 0, where V SRE denotes the implications for entrepreneurs
of the current generation, V LRL denotes the implications for laborers of the future generations, etc.
Here b1 and b5 denote the bottom 1% and the bottom 5% of the distributions, respectively; t10, t5,
and t1 denote the top 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; and pi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 denotes quintiles.39
b1 b5 b10 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 t10 t5 t1
V SRE −1.6 −2.1 0.7 9.4 21 22.6 23.3 23.7 11.9 5.9 1.2
V SRL −0.8 0.1 3.6 12.7 20.7 21.8 22.3 22.5 12.3 5.6 1.1
V LRE 0.8 3.8 7.6 15.2 15.6 16.2 17.6 35.4 24.9 17.9 7.9
V LRL 0.9 4.4 8.8 17.6 17.8 18.1 18.8 27.6 17.3 11.4 4.4
Table 5. Welfare Implications of Eliminating the Capital-Income Tax.
39Under complete markets, and starting from the steady state with τK = 0.25, the average long-run welfare gain
(in terms of consumption equivalent) of eliminating the capital-income tax is 1.7%, whereas the average short-run
welfare gain is 0.6%.
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These cross-sectional differences can be explained by referring to Figure 7, which plots, in the
top row for the current generation, and in the bottom row for the long-run generation, the response
of human wealth and of the (risk-adjusted) returns to saving for laborers and entrepreneurs, against
the tax rate of the policy reform. Let’s first turn to the immediate implications. The decrease in
the capital-income tax from τK = 0.25 to τK = 0 increases the demand for precautionary saving,
and therefore leads to a fall in the interest rate.40 Roughly speaking, since the capital stock is
historically given and cannot change, the fall in the interest rate increases human wealth. For
poor agents, whether entrepreneurs or laborers, human wealth constitutes a significant part of
total wealth, and hence they benefit from the elimination of the tax. Furthermore, poor agents
do not benefit much from insurance directly, since they invest little or nothing in the risky asset.
Therefore, in the short run, poor agents prefer the zero capital-income tax regime, mainly because
the elimination of the tax increases their safe income, and safe income is a big part of their total
wealth. Turning to the long run, the elimination of the capital-income tax increases the demand
for precautionary saving, and it therefore leads to a fall in the interest rate. But now, the general-
equilibrium implications of the interest rate adjustment for capital accumulation become relevant.
In particular, the fall in the interest rate reduces steady-state wealth and capital accumulation. It
turns out that the fall in the steady-state capital stock dominates the fall in the interest rate, so
that in the end steady-state human wealth falls. This adversely affects poor agents of all types,
since human wealth represents a big part of their total wealth. Because the risk-adjusted return for
entrepreneurs, ρˆ, increases when the capital-income tax is eliminated, the cost of the policy change
is not as high for an entrepreneur as it is for a laborer at any given level of wealth.
40Immediately after a reform that reduces the capital tax from a very high level, the net interest rate may actually
increase. This possibility, which does not emerge in the long run, is due to the usual distortionary effect of big tax
increases on investment.
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Figure 7. Immediate (SR) vs Long Run (LR): Human Wealth and Saving Returns
In conclusion, the elimination of the capital-income tax has welfare implications that differ
across time and in the cross-section of the population. These differences are due to the general-
equilibrium effects of the interest rate adjustment on capital accumulation. In particular, they
operate mainly through the different response of human wealth: immediately after the elimination
of the tax, when the capital stock cannot adjust, human wealth increases, whereas in the long
run, when capital accumulation changes endogenously, human wealth falls. Therefore, current-
generation poor agents prefer a zero capital-income tax in the short run, whereas future-generation
poor agents prefer a positive capital-income tax. Rich agents always prefer a positive tax, but less
forcefully in the long-run, because in the long run the elimination of the tax increases the mean
entrepreneurial portfolio return.
8 Conclusions
This paper studies the aggregate and welfare effects of capital-income taxation in an environment
where agents face uninsurable idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risk. The counter-intuitive result emerg-
ing is that an increase in the capital-income tax may actually, due to its general-equilibrium insur-
ance aspect, stimulate capital accumulation. This result stands in stark contrast to the effects of
capital-income taxation in either complete-markets models, or in Bewley-type incomplete-markets
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models, since in those models capital-income taxation necessarily discourages capital accumulation.
Furthermore, the result is quantitatively significant: for the preferred calibration of the model, the
steady-state levels of the capital stock, output, and employment are all maximized for a positive
value of the capital-income tax, at which point output per work-hour is 2.65% higher than it would
have been had the tax rate been zero.41
Although the present paper provides some useful guidance about the direction of optimal policy,
it does not solve for the fully optimal policy. An interesting direction for future research is the
formal study of optimal policy, either in the Ramsey tradition (though allowing for lump-sum
taxes, as in the present model), or in the Mirrlees tradition of endogenizing the source of market
incompleteness and having no ad hoc restrictions placed on the set of available instruments.
This paper focuses on the effects of uninsurable entrepreneurial risk, and abstracts from labor-
income risk, borrowing constraints, and decreasing returns to scale at the individual level. Ex-
tending the model to include these relevant aspects of the data and revisiting the effects of capital
taxation in this richer setting is important, not only to get a better quantitative evaluation of
the implications of capital taxation, but also to examine whether the general-equilibrium effects
identified here might interact with other sources of market incompleteness in an interesting way.
For example, after an increase in the capital-income tax, the increase in steady-state wealth doc-
umented here could make borrowing constraints less binding. At the same time, the increase in
the steady-state interest rate could also increase the cost of borrowing. Further investigating these
rich general-equilibrium interactions will greatly facilitate a better theoretical and quantitative
assessment of the implications of fiscal policy in dynamic heterogeneous-agent environments.
41Under complete markets, and starting from a steady state with τK = 0.25, the capital-income tax would have to
be reduced to approximately τK = 0.15, in order for output per work-hour to increase by 2.65%.
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9 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1. Let preferences be described by:
Jt = {(1− e−β∆t)(c1−ψt nψt )1−1/θ + e−β∆t(Et[J1−γt+∆t])
1−1/θ
1−γ } 11−1/θ ,
where c is consumption and n is leisure. Then, given the processes for c and n, the utility process
is defined as the solution to the following integral equation:
Ut = Et
∫ ∞
t
z(cs, Us) ds , (31)
where
z(c, U) ≡ β
1− 1/θ
 (c1−ψt nψt )1−1/θ
((1− γ)U)
−1/θ+γ
1−γ
− (1− γ)U
 . (32)
Proof of Lemma 1. Define the functions:
g(x) =
((1− γ)x)
1−1/θ
1−γ
1− 1/θ ,
Ut =
J1−γt
1− γ .
Then:
g(Ut) =
J
1−1/θ
t
1− 1/θ = (1− e
−β∆t)
(c1−ψt n
ψ
t )
1−1/θ
1− 1/θ + e
−β∆tg(Et[Ut+∆t]) .
Take a first order Taylor expansion in ∆t :
g(Ut) = g(Ut) + β
(c1−ψt n
ψ
t )
1−1/θ
1− 1/θ ∆t− βg(Ut)∆t+ g
′(Ut)Et[∆Ut] .
Then:
Et[∆Ut] = −
β
(c1−ψt n
ψ
t )
1−1/θ
1−1/θ − βg(Ut)
g′(Ut)
∆t ,
where:
g(Ut)
g′(Ut)
=
(1− γ)Ut
(1− 1/θ) .
Hence:
Et[∆Ut] = −z(ct, nt, Ut)∆t ,
where:
z(ct, nt, Ut) ≡ β1− 1/θ [
(c1−ψt n
ψ
t )
1−1/θ
((1− γ)Ut)
−1/θ+γ
1−γ
− (1− γ)Ut] .
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For a more general proof of the above and for a proof of existence and uniqueness of the solution
to the integral equation (31) see Duffie and Epstein (1992).
Proof of Proposition 1. Because of the CRRA/CEIS specification of preferences, guess that
the value function for an entrepreneur is:
J(wE , t) = BEt
wE 1−γ
1− γ ,
where the term BEt captures the time dimension. The Bellman equation for an entrepreneur is:
0 = max
cE , nE , φ
z(cE , n
E
, JE(wE , t)) +
∂JE
∂wE
(wE , t)[(φ(1−τKt )rt+(1−φ)(1−τKt )Rt)wE−cE−(1−τLt )ωtnE ]
+
∂JE
∂t
(wE , t) +
1
2
∂2JE
∂wE 2
(wE , t)σ2(1− τKt )2φ2w2 + pEL[J(wL, t)− J(wE , t)] ,
where the function z is given by (32), and where the last term shows that the entrepreneur might
switch into being a worker with probability pEL. Because of the homogeneity of JE in wE , the
marginal propensity to consume and the portfolio choice will be the same for all entrepreneurs.
The first order condition for the optimal portfolio allocation gives the condition for φt in (16).
Combining the first order conditions for consumption and leisure we get the optimal leisure choice:
nit =
ψ
1− ψ
1
(1− τLt )ωt
cit . (33)
From the envelope condition we get:
mE ≡ BE 1−θ1−γ ( ψ
1− ψ
1
(1− τL)ω )
−ψ(1−θ)(1− ψ)θβθ .
Similarly, guess that the value function for a laborer is:
J(wL, t) = BLt
wL 1−γ
1− γ ,
The Bellman equation for a laborer is:
0 = max
cL,nL
z(cL, nL, JL(wL, t)) +
∂JL
∂wL
(wL, t)[RtwL − cL − (1− τLt )ωtnL]
+
∂JL
∂t
(wL, t) + pLE [J(wE , t)− J(wL, t)] .
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Following similar steps, we get from the envelope condition that:
mL ≡ BL 1−θ1−γ ( ψ
1− ψ
1
(1− τL)ω )
−ψ(1−θ)(1− ψ)θβθ .
It follows that:
BE
BL
= (
mE
mL
)
1−γ
1−θ .
Using this, the first order conditions, the envelope conditions, and plugging back into the Bellman
equation we get (18) and (19).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let R˜t be the effective risk-free rate. The human wealth for each
individual i = E,L in the economy is hit =
∫∞
t e
− ∫ st R˜jdj((1− τLs )ωs+Ts)ds. The human wealth of
the measure-χt group of entrepreneurs is HEt = χt
∫∞
t e
− ∫ st R˜jdj((1−τLs )ωs+Ts)ds, and the human
wealth of the measure-(1−χt) group of laborers is HLt = (1−χt)
∫∞
t e
− ∫ st R˜jdj((1− τLs )ωs + Ts)ds.
Hence total human wealth is Ht = HEt + H
L
t =
∫∞
t e
− ∫ st R˜jdj((1 − τLs )ωs + Ts)ds = hit. Using
the Leibniz rule, and substituting in from the government budget constraint (7), we get that the
evolution of total human wealth is described by (23). Since only entrepreneurs invest in capital,
the aggregate capital stock in the economy is given by Kt = φtWEt . For an agent in the E and L
group respectively, bEt + h
E
t = (1 − φt)wEt and bLt + hLt = wLt . Aggregating over each group, we
get BEt + χtHt = (1 − φt)WEt and BLt + (1 − χt)Ht = WL. Adding up and using the fact that
BEt + B
L
t = 0, we get Ht = (1 − φt)WEt + WLt . Now using Wt = WEt + WLt and Kt = φtWEt ,
we get Wt = Kt + Ht. Combining Ht = (1 − φt)WEt + WLt , Kt = φtWEt , and λt = WEt /Wt, we
get (24). Aggregating across leisure choices we get (ψ/(1− ψ))(1/((1− τLt )ωt))Ct + Lt = 1, where
Ct = mEt W
E
t +m
L
t W
L
t , W
L
t = Wt −WEt , and Wt = Kt +Ht. Aggregating across (12) and (13),
and adding up, using BEt +B
L
t = 0, Ht = H
E
t +H
L
t , and labor market clearing, we get:
Wt = [(1− τKt )rtKt + (1− τKt )RtHt −
1
1− ψCt]dt .
Using Ht = (1−φt)WEt +WLt , Kt = φtWEt , µt = (1−τKt )rt−(1−τKt )Rt, and Ct = mEt WEt +mLt WLt ,
and dividing through with Wt we get:
W˙t
Wt
= (1− τKt )rtφtµt + (1− τKt )Rt −
1
1− ψ (λtm
E
t + (1− λt)mLt ) ,
which gives (21) when we use ρt = φtµt + (1 − τKt )Rt. Aggregating across (12), and subtracting
from (21), we get (22).
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first the case with λ = 1 and v = 0 (and labor is exogenous,
so ψ = 0). Combining (18) or (19) in steady state, with (21) in steady state, and using the definitions
of ρ and ρˆ, we get equation (25). Combining (24) with (23) in steady state , we get equation (26).
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Now, let µ(R) and φ (R) denote, respectively, the risk premium and the fraction of effective
wealth held in capital, when K is given by (25):
µ(R) ≡
√
2θγσ2
1 + θ
(β − (1− τK)R) and φ(R) ≡
√
2θ
γσ2(1 + θ)
(β − (1− τK)R) . (34)
Note that µ′(R) < 0 and φ′(R) < 0. Next, let K (R) denote the solution to (25), or equivalently:
K(R) =
[
µ(R) + δ +R
α
] 1
α−1
. (35)
Finally, for τK ' 0, τL ' 0, δ ' 0, G = gY , and Y = f(K) = Kα, we can write equation (26) as:
D(R; g) ≡ (1− α− g) K(R)
α−1
R
− 1− φ (R)
φ(R)
, (36)
where α+g < 1. To establish existence and uniqueness of the steady state , it suffices to show that
there exists a unique R that solves D(R; g) = 0. For a given g, consider the limits of D as R→ 0+
and R → β−. Note that µ(0) = (2θγσ21+θ β)1/2 is finite and hence both φ(0) and K(0) are finite. It
follows that:
lim
R→0+
D(R; g) = (1− α− g)K(0)α−1 lim
R→0+
1
R
− 1
φ(0)
+ 1 = +∞ .
Furthermore, µ(β) = 0, implying φ (β) = 0 and K(β) = Kcompl ≡ (f ′)−1 (β) is finite. Hence:
lim
R→β−
D(R; g) = (1− α− g)K(β)α−1 1
β
− lim
R→β−
1
φ(R)
+ 1 = −∞ .
These properties, together with the continuity of D (R) in R, ensure the existence of an R ∈ (0, β)
such that D (R) = 0. If D (R; g) is strictly decreasing in R, then we also have uniqueness. To show
this, note that, from (36):
∂D
∂R
= (1− α− g)K(R)
α−1
R2
[
(α− 1)RK
′(R)
K (R)
− 1
]
+
φ′(R)
φ (R)2
. (37)
In addition:
Kα−1 =
f ′ (K)
α
,
K ′
K
=
1
α− 1
µ′ + 1
f ′ (K)
, and
φ′
φ2
=
γσ2µ′
µ2
,
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where the dependence of K, µ, and φ on R has been dropped for notational simplicity. Hence:
∂D
∂R
=
1− α− g
α
f ′ (K)
R2
[
R
µ′ + 1
f ′ (K)
− 1
]
+
γσ2µ′
µ2
=
=
1− α− g
α
Rµ′ +R− f ′ (K)
R2
+
γσ2µ′
µ2
.
Since µ′ (R) < 0 and R < f ′ (K (R)) for all R ∈ (0, β), it follows that ∂D/∂R < 0 for all R ∈ (0, β),
which completes the argument. When v > 0, an extension of the proof above shows that there is a
unique R solving D(R) = 0, where R ∈ (−v, β), and where:
D(R) ≡ (1− gτ
L)(1− α)K(R)α−1 + (1− g)τKfK(R)
((1− τK)R+ v) −
1
φ(R)λ(R)
+ 1 .
However, in that case, uniqueness has not been proved, although simulations suggest that the
steady state is always unique.
In order to see how the existence of two types of agents modifies the characterization of the
steady state, consider next the case where λ 6= 1, and take θ = 1 for simplicity. Then, the marginal
propensity to consume is always constant and equal to β, for both types of agents. Equation (21)
in steady state yields λ = (β − (1− τK)R)/(φµ). Combining this with (22) in steady state gives:
λ =
β − (1− τK)R+ pLE
β − (1− τK)R+ pLE + pEL , (38)
which verifies that λ < 1. Plugging this back into (21) in steady state, we get:
φµ =
(β − (1− τK)R)(β − (1− τK)R+ pLE + pEL)
(β − (1− τK)R+ pLE) ,
from which, if we use the definition of µ, we get:
FK(K)− δ = R+
√
1
λ(R)
γ σ2 (β − (1− τK)R) , (39)
as the relevant version of (25). Finally, combining (23) in steady state with (24), we get:
K =
φ(K,R) λ(R)
1− φ(K,R) λ(R)
(1− τL)ω(K) + (1− g) ( τL ω(K) + τK (FK(K)− δ )K )
(1− τK)R+ v , (40)
which is the relevant version of (26). Hence, the steady state is characterized by equations (38),
(39), and (40). So, (38) expresses λ as a function of R, (39) expresses K as a function of R, and
(40) solves for the equilibrium R, using K(R) and λ(R).
When labor is endogenous and θ = 1, then mE = mL = (1 − ψ)β, and the proofs above carry
through the same way, only now with fK(K/L) and ω(K/L). So for characterization of the steady
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state we need to add the labor market clearing condition, and the steady state system will be in
K,L,R. In particular, labor market clearing, combined with C = (1 − ψ)βW , λ = WE/W , and
WE = K/φ gives:
L = (
ψβ
(1− τL)ω(K,L)
1
λ(R)
K/L
φ(K,L,R)
+ 1)−1 .
Finally, when labor is endogenous and θ 6= 1 then:
λ =
1
1−ψm
L − (1− τK)R+ pLE
1
1−ψm
L − (1− τK)R+ pLE + pEL
,
and
µ =
√
γσ2(1− τ)2
λ
(
1
1− ψ (m
Eλ+mL(1− λ))− (1− τK)R) .
Here we need to add two more equations to characterize the steady state, namely the Euler con-
ditions for the marginal propensities to consume. This will be a system of two equations in two
unknowns to be solved as a function of steady state prices.42
Lemma 2. When the interest rate is exogenous, W ′(R) > 0⇔ R > R.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let v = 0, λ = 1, τK ' 0, τL ' 0, G = gY , and Y = Kα. Then, from
(23) in steady state, we have that H(R) = (1 − α − g)K(R)α/R, while K as a function of R is
given by (35). Hence, we can write W (R) = K(R) + H(R). Differentiating with respect to R, we
get that:
W ′(R) > 0 ⇔ µ′(R) < (α− 1) α K
2(α−1)
R2
φ
φ+ α(1− φ) − 1 ,
which means that the interest rate has to be higher than a given threshold, i.e. R > R, since from
(34) it is easy to show that µ′′(R) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let the newborn household receive a weighted average aWt+(1−a)wit,
where 0 < a < 1, upon birth.43 Let dt be the indicator function, where dt = 1 for entrepreneurs
and dt = 0 for laborers. The dynamic system for the state vector (ξit, dt), where , ξ
i
t ≡ wit/Wt as
in the text, is:
ξ˙it = µ(ξ
i
t, dt) + σ(ξ
i
t, dt) dz
i
t − (ξit − 1)dN1t
d˙t = s(dt) dN2t ,
42The conditions needed for establishing that λ > 0 are satisfied in simulations.
43One could rationalize this through the existence of an estate tax on the agent: if the agent dies, the government
takes away a(wit −Wt) from his descendants. The idea is to keep the aggregate wealth unaffected. Here, expected
wealth for the agent at any point in time is v · (aWt + (1− a)wit) + (1− v) ·wit, and aggregating across agents yields
the desired result. The special case a = 1 implies that each newborn agent enters the economy endowed with the
sum of the mean economy wealth plus his human wealth.
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where dN1t is the Poisson process denoting death with arrival rate vdt, and where dN
2
t is the Poisson
switching process with arrival intensity p(I) dt:
p(d) = pLE if d = 0
p(d) = pEL if d = 1 ,
where:
s(d) = 1 if d = 0
s(d) = −1 if d = 1 ,
and:
µ(ξt, 1) = [
1− λ
1− ψ (m
L
t −mEt ) + φt(1− λt)(1− τKt )(rt −Rt)]ξt
µ(ξt, 0) = [
λ
1− ψ (m
E
t −mLt )− φtλt(1− τKt )(rt −Rt)]ξt
σ(ξt, 1) = φtσt(1− τKt )ξt
σ(ξt, 0) = 0 .
Let ΦE ≡ Φ(ξ, 1) and ΦL ≡ Φ(ξ, 0) be the conditional distributions for entrepreneurs and labor-
ers respectively. In steady state the conditional distribution ΦL satisfies the forward Kolmogorov
equation:
0 = −∂(µ(ξ, 0) ΦL)
∂ξ
− p(0) ΦL + (pΦL)(ξ, 0− η(0))− vΦL + v1− aΦL(
ξ − a
1− a) ,
and the conditional distribution ΦE satisfies the forward Kolmogorov equation:
0 =
1
2
∂2(σ(ξ, d)2ΦE)
∂ξ2
− ∂(µ(ξ, 1) ΦE)
∂ξ
− p(1) ΦE + (pΦE)(ξ, 1− η(1))− vΦE + v1− aΦE(
ξ − a
1− a) .
In the two equations above we need to calculate:
(pΦ)(ξ, d− η(d)) = p(d− η(d))Φ(ξ, d− η(d)) .
To that end, let the old state be d, and the new state be d′. They are related through d′ = d+s(d),
and we need to compute η(d′) = s(d). For d = 0, we have d′ = 0 + s(0) = 0 + 1 = 1, and
η(d′) = η(1) = s(0) = 1, hence η(1) = 1. For d = 1, we have d′ = 1 + s(1) = 1 − 1 = 0, and
η(d′) = η(0) = s(1) = −1, hence η(0) = −1. Therefore:
p(0− η(0))Φ(ξ, 0− η(0)) = p(1)Φ(ξ, 1) = pELΦE ,
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and:
p(1− η(1))Φ(ξ, 1− η(1)) = p(0)Φ(ξ, 0) = pLEΦL .
Substituting for µ(ξt, 0), µ(ξt, 1), σ(ξt, 0), σ(ξt, 1) and using the above, we can write the system of
the two Kolmogorov equations as:
0 = c1ξ2
∂2ΦE
∂ξ2
+ c2ξ
∂ΦE
∂ξ
+ c3ΦE + pLE ΦL +
v
1− αΦE(
ξ − a
1− a)
0 = c4ξ
∂ΦL
∂ξ
+ c5ΦL + pEL ΦE +
v
1− aΦL(
ξ − a
1− a) ,
where:
c1 =
φ2σ2(1− τ)2
2
c2 = 2φ2σ2(1− τ)2 − [ 11− ψ (m−m
E) + φµ(1− λ)]
c3 = φ2σ2(1− τ)2 − [ 11− ψ (m−m
E) + φµ(1− λ)]− pEL − v
c4 = λφµ− 11− ψ (m¯−m
L)
c5 = λφµ− 11− ψ (m¯−m
L)− pLE − v
Now, the Laplace transform for any variable y is defined as:
Y (s) =
∫ ∞
0
e−sty(t)dt ,
and therefore:
Y ′(s) = −
∫ ∞
0
e−stty(t)dt = −L[ty(t)] ⇒ L[ty] = − d
ds
Y (s) ,
and:
Y ′(s) = −
∫ ∞
0
e−stty(t)dt ⇒ Y ′′(s) =
∫ ∞
0
e−stt2y(t)dt = L[t2y(t)] .
Hence, we have that:
L[ty′] =
∫ ∞
0
e−stty′dt = −sY ′(s)− Y (s) ,
and:
L[t2y′′] =
∫ ∞
0
e−stt2y′′dt = s2Y ′′(s) + 4sY ′(s) + 2Y (s) .
Let c = 11−a , k =
a
1−a , and τ = ct− k, then dτ = cdt and t = τ+kc . So we have:
L[y(
t− a
1− a)] =
∫ ∞
k/c
e−sty(ct− k)dt = 1
c
e−s
k
cL[y(t)]s→s/c = (1− a)e−k(1−a)L[y(t)]s→s(1−a) .
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Therefore, when a = 1:
L[y(
t− a
1− a)] = (1− 1)e
−k(1−1)
∫ ∞
0
y(t)dt = 0 · 1 · 1 ,
if y is a probability density function. Hence, the last term in both Kolmogorov equations will drop
out when a = 1. After changing variables to ξ = ex, and defining ∂ΦE/∂x ≡ Φ2 we get:

Φ′L
Φ′E
Φ′2
 =

0 c5/c4 − 1 pEL/c4
1 0 0
c2/c1 − 3c1 −pLE/c1 −2 + c2/c1 − c3/c1


ΦL
ΦE
Φ2

Since all coefficients are constant, and ξ is bounded, a Lipschitz condition is satisfied, hence the
solution to the system exists and is unique.44 The conditional densities can be recovered by inverting
the Laplace transforms.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider the case with λ = 1 and v = 0. Then, using (18) or (19) and
(21) in steady state, using the definition of ρˆ, and taking the total differential with respect to K
and R, gives:
∂K
∂R
=
φ− θ(1− φ)
φ(θ + 1)
1
FKK
,
which proves that:
∂K
∂R
> 0⇔ θ > φ
1− φ.
Lemma 3. The steady state measure of entrepreneurs is given by pLE/(pLE + pEL).
Proof of Lemma 3. Call χ the measure of entrepreneurs today, and χ′ their measure tomorrow.
Then χ′ = χ(1− pEL) + (1− χ)pLE . But in steady state χ = χ′ hence χ = pLE/(pLE + pEL).
44For proper (and non-restrictive) initial conditions, the solution is also stable.
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